Research
Job Market Paper
Latent Statecraft: Political Alignment in the Shadow of Tariffs
Tariffs have long been understood as a tool of economic statecraft, used not only to manage trade but to extract political returns from trading partners. This may be why tariff-cut commitments so often look lopsided: a hegemon may offer periphery countries deeper cuts than it receives in return, with the imbalance possibly compensated on a different margin, namely political concessions. Using the United States as the hegemon and UN General Assembly voting as our measure of political concessions, we measure economic concessions as the terms-of-trade effect of bilateral tariff cuts and exploit variation in their value over time. We find that periods of larger tariff concessions from the U.S. are also periods of greater political concessions by periphery countries. This holds even absent new tariff policy: a tariff schedule’s economic value is continuously revalued by shifting trade patterns, and the political returns to a concession made years earlier track this revaluation.
Working Papers
Rebalancing Supply Networks after a Geopolitical Shock
This paper studies how importers rebalance their supply networks when an established supplier becomes a source of geopolitical risk, using the 2019 Korea–Japan trade dispute. After the dispute, imports from Japan fell more for products whose alternative supply—measured from world trade flows that exclude Korea to avoid mean reversion—was more concentrated, but these products added no more supplier countries and expanded imports from other countries no more than others. Instead, sourcing was rebalanced within existing supply networks along two dimensions. First, purchases of these products became relatively less concentrated across existing suppliers. Second, across all products, imports shifted away from suppliers whose own geopolitical risk rose, a response that strengthened over time. These results suggest that importers respond to geopolitical risk less by forming new supplier relationships than by reweighting purchases across existing ones.
Trade Imbalances and Reciprocity in the WTO: A Rule-Based Adjustment Framework
This paper examines the erosion of reciprocity in the multilateral trading system and how it can be restored through a layered set of policies. Using a multi-country structural trade model, we quantify the tariff adjustments required to restore the balance of concessions prevailing at the establishment of the WTO. Restoring that balance requires higher U.S. tariffs on most trading partners, and the required increases are systematically larger for partners with which the United States runs larger bilateral deficits. Building on this relationship and on Keynes’s principle of symmetric adjustment, we propose a framework that sequences three instruments: targeted tariff reductions by surplus countries, imbalance-based fees with redistribution, and tariff increases by deficit countries as a last resort. Our analysis highlights the need for coordinated and adaptive mechanisms to maintain reciprocity in a dynamic global trading system.